CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 3 February 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gérard Errera (France)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 669th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I intend first of all to give the floor to the speakers on the list for today, then to proceed to the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and lastly to turn to the requests for participation in our work from States that are not members of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Romania, Japan and the United States of America. I therefore now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania) (translated from French): The first month in the work of the Conference on Disarmament is always the most stimulating and the most difficult period of the year. Allow me, Mr. President, to express to you first of all our satisfaction at seeing you in the Chair during this month which is going to require difficult efforts of concentration with a view to organizing our work. We are convinced that you, representing a country with which Romania has always maintained excellent relations, will be able, thanks to your tact and great experience, to guarantee the success of this first phase. You may count on the unreserved support of my delegation. Allow me also to express our gratitude to Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt who served as President in an exemplary manner for the month of August and coordinated our consultations during the inter-sessional period. We extend our greetings to our new Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, and our new Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail. I would like to take this opportunity to extend a cordial welcome to the new colleagues who have taken up their duties as representatives to the Conference - Ambassador Yousuf Omar of Ethiopia, Ambassador Juan Carlos Sánchez Arnau of Argentina, Ambassador Alfredo Tarre Murzi of Venezuela and Ambassador Alessandro Vattani of Italy.

(continued in English)

The past four years have witnessed profound changes in the political order that was put in place after World War II. The international community today is at an historic juncture of momentous change. With the disintegration of the bipolar structure, the end of the cold war and the confrontation between the two military blocs, the world was given the possibility for the first time in the nuclear era to successfully tackle the problems of reducing the arms race with the aim of eliminating the spectre of nuclear annihilation, cutting down military forces and conventional armaments, promoting transparency in armaments and military activities and various other important confidence-building measures.

The international situation remains yet complex and fluid, as zones of instability, conflict and tension seem to proliferate. The Yugoslav tragedy brought back the flames of war on the European continent for the first time in more than 40 years. Other conflicts in the former Soviet Union as well as in

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other parts of the world are no less preoccupying. Therefore a renewed effort should now be devoted to the implementation of a global agenda of arms control and disarmament for the post-cold war era, regionally or globally. New rules, norms and standards to enhance a sustainable international security order have to be fixed.

The world no longer faces the need to stabilize a relation of nuclear confrontation, while stability has become a more complex objective as it has to be pursued in a variety of specific contexts. These negative evolutions undermine the efforts aimed at arms control and disarmament. It proves that indeed disarmament is closely linked with international security and in order to be successful it has to be integrated with international security. The United Nations revival in accordance with its natural vocation, as defined by the Charter, the increasing role of the General Assembly and especially of the Security Council, the strengthening of CSCE and other regional structures, appear to confirm the growing ascendancy of the political over the military factor.

In this framework it is worth mentioning the interest expressed by Central and Eastern European countries, including Romania, to be admitted to NATO and the recent "Partnership for Peace" plan, which is seen as a preliminary stage finally leading to the quality of a full member of the Alliance. It is well known that from the very beginning Romania expressed its firm wish to become a NATO member, assuming all responsibilities derived from that membership. This wish was renewed on the eve of the last NATO summit meeting by the letter Romania's President addressed to the Alliance Secretary-General as well as to the heads of State and government of the member States. Thus by the new "Partnership for Peace", which Romania was the first to join officially only a week ago, NATO would make an important step towards its enlargement. "Partnership for Peace" will mark a new stage in Romania's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.

The basic changes in strategic perceptions and the removal of former threats are being codified in new agreements that contribute to a more peaceful world at lower levels of armaments. We should indeed derive encouragement from recent developments and achievements in the field of disarmament and arms control. The START agreements for the elimination of strategic arms bear witness that the nuclear threat has receded dramatically. The START II agreement, which will reduce by two thirds the current levels of strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia, will enhance security and stability - both military and politically - on the international scene and will give impetus to bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts aimed at eliminating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the world. Romania welcomes the recent conclusion by the United States, the Russian Federation and Ukraine of a nuclear agreement aimed at removing an important number of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads. This is indeed a real breakthrough that will enhance the security of the entire world. Now we are waiting for rapid process towards the full implementation of the START commitments.

The conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention has proved the indispensable role of multilateral disarmament endeavours in the post-cold-war

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period and has been considered a tremendous success for the negotiating effort of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. The CWC is a milestone in the process of disarmament, since it provides for the total elimination of a whole category of weapons of mass destruction. It is the belief of my delegation that the chemical weapons Convention remains a standard instrument that could be a model for the elaboration of other disarmament agreements which the CD will be charged with.

The notable progress that has been achieved in the work of the Preparatory Commission so far in The Hague will definitely advance the process for most States signatories to ratify the Convention at an early date. Romania intends to conclude the ratification process before the end of this year. Meanwhile we shall spare no effort toward making the Convention universal and shall join all common endeavours to this end.

The last two years have registered favourable results for improving and strengthening the regime under another important international instrument - the 1972 biological weapons Convention. This latter agreement, aimed at excluding completely the possibility of biological agents and toxins being used as weapons, represented a real turning-point in the modern age, for it was the first international document since World War II to provide for the actual elimination of an abhorrent weapon from the arsenals of nations. So far, out of the three international treaties covering weapons of mass destruction in the nuclear, biological and chemical fields, the BWC is the only one deprived of policing mechanisms or verification measures. Therefore Romania, while working toward universal adherence to the Convention, supported the decision taken by the third BWC review conference in 1991 to establish an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint. Romanian experts took an active part in the work of VEREX, which was successfully accomplished last September by the adoption of a consensus report. In accordance with its main conclusion, some of the potential verification measures would contribute to strengthening the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention. Against this background, last autumn Romania joined those countries asking officially for the convening of a special conference of the States parties to the Convention that would take a decision on further steps to strengthen its verification machinery and thus close another loophole in the broader regime for weapons of mass destruction.

Significant progress has been achieved in the area of conventional disarmament. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe established a new military balance at a substantially lower level of armaments. My Government welcomes the successful completion of the first reduction phase of the CFE Treaty, whose full implementation and integrity remain fundamental to European stability and security. At the same time, confidence-building measures have proved pace-setters for disarmament measures, as stipulated in the 1990 Vienna Document which put in place and into operation in Europe a comprehensive system of confidence- and security-building measures. These measures contribute to transparency, predictability and crisis management and may constitute an example to be followed for enhancing security and cooperation in other regions. In line with this and as a transparency

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measure, the 1992 "open skies" Treaty, which provides for short-notice surveillance flights by aircraft over an area from Vancouver east to Pavlovskoe (the former Vladivostok), contributes to regional stability by allowing countries the opportunity to monitor their neighbours, thus reducing concerns.

With respect to the future agenda of disarmament and arms control, my Government shares the view that the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of conventional weapons should constitute a paramount concern of the international community in the years to come. Future multilateral arms control agreements, export controls exercised by supplier groups, regimes and other institutions such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) should play major roles in the many efforts which will be required in order to reduce, cut, control and cope with the consequences of the increase in weaponry: the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and advanced conventional weapons and delivery systems such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and modern aircraft. My delegation will join other interested delegations in the promotion of new measures and initiatives to better control and constrain proliferation and, in general, to refine non-proliferation strategy.

We share widely expressed views concerning weapons of mass destruction, efforts to prevent proliferation of these weapons and their delivery vehicles, arms transfers, transparency in armaments and other confidence-building measures. In our opinion, treaties on weapons of mass impact and export control regimes are complementary, interlocking parts of international security. Export control regimes are meant to make it easier for any recipient State to acquire whatever technology it needs for its peaceful development. States that strictly abide by non-proliferation regimes should have no reason to complain about such regimes. That is why Romania actively participates in a number of groups and regimes aimed at developing responsible proliferation control, not only of nuclear, biological and chemical arms, but also of long-range delivery systems and dual-use technologies. My country is considering joining those multilateral arrangements of which is not yet a full member such as, for instance, MTCR and the Australia Group. In fact, my Government has already publicly committed itself to comply with the guidelines and the spirit of such international groupings and regimes and has developed national legislation accordingly.

The global non-proliferation regime has many facets, but its heart and fundamental pillar remains the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system and national export controls. The NPT and its verification machinery effectively bar the dissemination of nuclear weapons and provide an indispensable instrument for international peace and security.

The NPT, which has now 160 States parties, including all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, is the most widely supported arms control treaty there has ever been. Yet the NPT has not fulfilled all the hopes of its creators. There are continuing challenges to this Treaty which, if ignored, could undermine its credibility and effectiveness. Important absentees, compliance problems and worrying proliferation pressures

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in different regions of the world are sources of weakness as well. Without underestimating these problems, we have however to acknowledge that the large mass of parties are fulfilling their obligations in good faith and that it was the NPT which created the political framework for all arms control achievements of the last quarter of the century. Therefore, my Government reaffirms its confidence in this Treaty, which is, indeed, the cornerstone of the world's non-proliferation regime.

Next year the NPT parties will decide by a majority vote "whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods". It is said that prospects for an indefinite extension depend upon arguments that the NPT is meeting its goals. There is no need to argue that two of the main goals - to foster the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to encourage nuclear arms control and disarmament - are being met. It is the view of my delegation that the third main goal - to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons - has also registered positive, encouraging results. In this regard, we consider it a measure of the NPT's success, inter alia, that at present we have the same number of nuclear-weapon States as 25 years ago and that in recent years we have witnessed important changes in the nuclear balance due to the INF and START treaties.

The NPT establishes a norm, a standard of international behaviour backed up by a legal process. This leads States to renounce the right to acquire nuclear weapons. Nobody can deny that the existence of the NPT has been essential to the efforts to bind three non-Russian republics of the former USSR to adherence to non-nuclear-weapon status. These are a clear benefit of keeping the NPT in force indefinitely.

In our opinion, the preparatory process for the 1995 review and extension conference for the non-proliferation Treaty should be an opportunity for States parties to redouble their efforts in attaining the objective of non-proliferation and strengthening the NPT. The second in a series of four preparatory committees for this Conference concluded in New York two weeks ago, discussing matters of procedure, organization and substance. The first two Prepcom meetings thus paved the way for a thorough review of the way this international instrument operates and for a well-founded decision on the duration of its extension. Romania firmly believes that the non-proliferation Treaty should continue to be in existence indefinitely and unconditionally after 1995.

With the ending of the cold war and with the declared nuclear Powers having no major Power as an "enemy" that must be deterred from a nuclear attack, there is now an opportunity to end the nuclear arms race and to move rapidly toward the reduction and the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. That is, of course, the surest and best way to end the danger of nuclear proliferation and to rid the world of the nuclear threat.

The need to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) has become a crucial issue connected with the NPT and with nuclear disarmament in general. To date, with the positive change in the international political climate, fresh momentum is gathering for renewed efforts towards the realization of this goal, a process in which Romania is ready to play a full

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and constructive part. The conclusion of a CTBT will certainly strengthen the existing non-proliferation regime and would undoubtedly increase the chances of success at the NPT review conference. In addition, it will dispel all the concerns about environmental damage by nuclear pollution. A universally applicable and internationally verifiable test ban would strengthen international security, contribute to ongoing efforts to prevent States from developing a nuclear-weapon programme and represent a further step towards nuclear disarmament.

My delegation shares the view that the ban should be effectively verifiable by means of both seismic and non-seismic technologies. The core of the future international verification system could be the seismic data exchange network, on which extensive work has been accomplished by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (GSE). As an active participant in the GSE, Romania fully supports the tremendous efforts made by the Group and its contributing scientific experts to establish a solid verification architecture to serve the needs of a CTB treaty.

Now, due to the substantial and painstaking efforts deployed in the inter-sessional period by Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan and lately by you, Mr. President, and thanks to the understanding and the spirit of compromise and cooperation of all delegations, we have the necessary means to proceed smoothly to effective negotiations, i.e. an Ad Hoc Committee with a clear negotiating mandate and a Chairman. My delegation expresses its full confidence in the diplomatic talent and ability, in the experience and professional skills of Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico - the freshly elected Chairman of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee - and pledges its full support to all endeavours in order to achieve concrete results in drafting a treaty prohibiting all nuclear explosions in all environments.

Turning to another important issue, namely effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (NSA), my delegation deems that progress on this crucial area of regional and global peace and security will facilitate further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, and that full-scope nuclear security guarantees in favour of the non-nuclear-weapon States would pave the way for the success of the review and extension of the non-proliferation Treaty at the 1995 conference. Such an arrangement should essentially be premised upon a universal and legally binding international agreement providing for negative as well as positive security assurances that are global in scope, uniform and comprehensive and ensure the equality of all States renouncing the acquisition of nuclear weapons through multilateral treaties. At the same time, a search for a solution to the problem of security assurances should not leave aside the United Nations, which has considerably enhanced its role and credibility in maintaining international peace and security. Therefore we favour the idea of a Security Council confirmation - on a broader basis - of the commitments which were originally undertaken by three nuclear-weapon States in Security Council resolution 255 (1968).

The formal debates and informal consultations which took place last year in the NSA Ad Hoc Committee - which I had the honour to chair - demonstrated

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the readiness of the delegations to continue the search for a common approach on the substance of negative security assurances. It is the view of my delegation that the time is now ripe for us to address this issue of utmost importance in a concrete manner and to lay down on paper appropriate provisions of future agreements. I am confident that the new Chairman of the NSA Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany, whose ability and professional capacity have been proven again during his chairmanship of the OS Ad Hoc Committee, will succeed in laying down the basis of a good start towards fulfilling the negotiating mandate of this subsidiary body.

Another most welcome step towards the goal of stemming nuclear proliferation would be to seek an international halt to the production of weapons-grade fissionable materials. The existing amounts of plutonium and highly enriched uranium have been for years in abundant supply for the declining number of nuclear weapons. It seems quite possible now to codify the cessation of such production in a legally binding instrument which could reassure the world community - by including appropriate verification machinery - that fissionable materials are not being covertly produced or procured. I wish every success to Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, who was elected as special coordinator for open-ended consultations on a fissile materials cut-off, in his difficult task of clarifying the appropriate measures and steps to be taken in this field.

The distressing events and armed conflicts occurring in various parts of the world, notably Eastern Europe, clearly prove the consequences of unbridled and excessive accumulation of conventional weapons. That is why Romania attaches just as much importance to the control of increasingly dangerous conventional arms as to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass impact. Against this background, the area of "transparency in armaments" is indeed challenging. It touches upon issues relating to excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms on which international efforts are urgently called for in various parts of the world. As the President of Romania, His Excellency Mr. Ion Iliescu, stated last June before the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament, the overall aspects regarding "transparency in armaments" could be regulated through an international treaty of universal vocation, which would set standards and procedures, as well as appropriate implementation mechanisms. Agreed "guidelines" to serve as an "international code of conduct" could be a first step to this end.

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms is an important component of "transparency in armaments". Some 82 States, including Romania, have by now submitted data on their imports and exports of conventional weapons. This is a promising start, although broader participation remains essential. In our opinion, the Register could establish an international code of conduct for the purposes of controlling arms transfers and the activities of weapons suppliers in accordance with universally applicable rules and standards. Romania will maintain its efforts to carry this important confidence-building initiative further. I warmly congratulate Ambassador György Boytha of Hungary on his election as Chairman of the TIA Ad Hoc Committee. I am sure that under his able guidance this Committee will register further notable progress.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and the kind words he addressed to me and to my country, which I very much appreciated. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): I have taken the floor today to express, at the initial stage of this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament, the principal views of the delegation of Japan on the issues before us.

Following the successful conclusion of the negotiation of the chemical weapons convention, the Conference seemed to undergo a transitional period last year, searching for its new priority tasks to be addressed. At the time when the raison d'être of the Conference was questioned as we saw dramatic changes in the international security environment surrounding arms control and disarmament, the Conference succeeded in smoothly starting its work by adopting pragmatic methods without wasting too much time on procedural debates as had often been the case before.

A breakthrough was achieved on the issue of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban last year, which had long been regarded as an issue of the highest priority of the Conference. In the favourable political circumstances created by the declared or de facto testing moratorium of the nuclear-weapon States, a historic decision was taken on 10 August to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Building on this decision, a draft specific mandate for the negotiations was agreed to, during the course of the inter-sessional consultations, and was formally adopted at the beginning of this year's session of the Conference on 25 January, Mr. President, under your presidency. The mandate, I believe, has laid an appropriate ground for the forthcoming substantive negotiations on this important issue. Also at the last plenary on Tuesday, we could agree on a Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. I, having had the privilege to chair the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban last year, am very pleased by these developments and would like to take this opportunity to thank all my colleagues here for their cooperation extended to me. I also would like to congratulate Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico on having been elected Chairman of the Committee this year to lead the important negotiations, and express our hope that the Committee will make important progress under his chairmanship.

Japan has long attached the greatest importance to the issue of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. Another landmark last year was the consensus adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of the CTB resolution urging the Conference to proceed intensively, as a priority task, in its negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My delegation has a definite objective for the 1994 session of the Conference, and I believe that this objective is shared by all delegations which have assembled here. Namely, we will make every possible effort to contribute to rapid progress in the negotiations on a CTBT. In so doing, my delegation urges at the same time all nuclear-weapon States to continue to refrain from testing to maintain the present political climate favourable to the CTBT negotiations.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

It is, of course, a matter for the Ad Hoc Committee itself to work out in detail how the negotiations are to be initiated. At this stage I confine myself to stating that it is the hope of Japan that we will discuss the basic elements of the treaty and identify the key issues to be addressed in an efficient manner, so that we may be able to start the drafting of a CTB treaty text as soon as possible. It is not appropriate to set artificial deadlines for the entire negotiation of the treaty, since if we rush we may end up with an incomplete and inappropriate content of the treaty. Nevertheless it is essential to proceed to the drafting work at the earliest possible date.

Having said this, I would like to introduce our preliminary views on some of the basic elements of the treaty. As to the scope of a CTBT, Japan is of the view that any nuclear-weapon test explosion should be prohibited, including those which are called "peaceful nuclear explosions".

The question of verification is the most difficult but important issue in the negotiation of a CTBT. We understand from the discussions we have had so far that there is general agreement that the seismic network which has been elaborated over many years by the Group of Seismic Experts (GSE) can provide an effective means of verification. We should be reminded, however, that the next technical test by the GSE to be conducted with a view to establishing the network (GSETT-3) will only begin in January 1995 and that in the meantime a number of points remain to be clarified, including such points as, for instance, how much it would cost to set up the network and how such a network would be operated. Therefore, it is essential to find solutions to these questions as soon as possible in order to reach an early conclusion of the negotiation of a CTBT. From this standpoint, Japan decided to host a workshop on CTB verification in the middle of March this year, to consider the problems of CTB verification mainly based on seismological methods, for the purpose of contributing to the promotion of the CTBT negotiations.

As to the verification system itself, we should aim to elaborate an effective verification regime, based on the combination of a monitoring system, of which the seismic monitoring network will be the key component, and on-site inspection. At the same time, due consideration should be given to the achievement of cost-effectiveness of a verification regime by making extensive use of national technical means of States parties to the treaty. Furthermore, such a verification regime needs to be flexible to adapt itself to the advance of technologies, and to improve the capability of detecting smaller and covert nuclear explosions.

With regard to on-site inspection, the points to be addressed are such matters as when it is needed, how it is conducted and what is the range and content of activities. For the elaboration of these points, our experience in the negotiation of the chemical weapons Convention may serve as good guidance.

On the questions of adherence and entry into force, while it is essential to ensure the widest possible adherence, it may not be advisable to provide unnecessarily heavy conditions on the entry into force of the treaty.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

My delegation welcomes the fact that Ambassador Shannon of Canada was appointed as special coordinator on the issue of the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices ("cut-off"). My delegation hopes that forthcoming consultations under Ambassador Shannon on this new subject entrusted to the Conference will lay the foundation for the negotiations in the near future. The question of a "cut-off" is directly related to nuclear non-proliferation and in that sense it is the one which should go hand in hand with a CTBT. Therefore, Japan thinks it appropriate that a "cut-off" convention should be negotiated here in the Conference on Disarmament while appreciating that detailed technical elaboration on verification and safeguards may be entrusted to IAEA.

Now I would like to briefly address some other issues before us. Before doing so, I should like to extend our congratulations to Ambassador Norberg of Sweden for his assumption of the role of Special Coordinator on the agenda of the CD. On the question of negative security assurances (NSA), various views were expressed last year, but regrettably no tangible outcome emerged in terms of negotiating a treaty text. I hope that some substantive progress will be achieved this year at the re-established Ad Hoc Committee on NSA under the chairmanship of Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany.

As to transparency in armaments (TIA), last year the Conference established, for the first time in its history, an Ad Hoc Committee on TIA where a number of concrete proposals were put forward and intensive discussions were carried out. My delegation was encouraged by these developments. As for the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, more than 80 countries participated in its first year, which is, in our view, worth appreciation as a good start. This year, there will be three meetings of the governmental experts to discuss further development of the Register. Japan looks forward to a successful outcome of the meetings. Also here in the Conference on Disarmament, we should continue our deliberations on TIA as an important issue which requires sustained efforts. We congratulate Ambassador Boytha of Hungary on his assumption of the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA. We hope that more constructive deliberations than last year will be made, in particular on the question of military holdings and procurement through national production.

On the pending issue of the expansion of the CD membership, it is the hope of my delegation that this issue will be solved as early as possible and that the eventual expansion will contribute to the activities of the Conference.

The non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been playing a pivotal role in maintaining and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the subject which should be addressed with the highest priority now by the international community. Next year will be the critical year in that the future of the NPT will be decided upon. I believe that the negotiations and deliberations in the field of nuclear disarmament to be held this year in the Conference, especially on a CTBT, "cut-off" and NSA, are decisively important in building a favourable political environment which will have an impact on the success of the NPT review and extension conference to be held next year.

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

We believe that the Conference has sufficient potential to deal successfully with these issues. Maximum use should be made of this potential to realize the hopes of the international community for greater stability and security.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me to offer my congratulations to you as well as best wishes for success in guiding the Conference at the start of the 1994 session. You have my full support and that of my delegation in this difficult task.

(continued in English)

I would also like to express thanks to Ambassador Zahran of Egypt for his skilful guidance and persistent hard work as the CD President during the long inter-sessional period which ended last week. And I welcome CD Secretary-General Petrovsky and Deputy Secretary-General Bensmail as well as our new colleagues who have joined the CD since last year's closing plenary.

The importance the United States attaches to the 1994 session of the CD, as we begin negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, was symbolized by the message from the President of the United States presented to the first plenary meeting of the Conference by John D. Holum, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In that message, President Clinton reiterated the United States commitment to a comprehensive and verifiable ban on all nuclear explosions at the earliest possible time. This commitment has been put into action in a number of ways: by the United States moratorium on testing, by the United States appeal to all other nuclear-weapons States to show the same restraint; by United States support of the historic CD decision last August to negotiate a test-ban treaty; and by United States support and co-sponsorship of the consensus United Nations General Assembly resolution on a CTBT.

United States support for a CTBT is based upon fundamental concerns about international peace and security. Others share these concerns; many States represented here have spoken of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of nuclear weapons in particular. More than 30 years ago, the signatories of the partial test-ban Treaty established the goal of achieving "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time," a goal that was reaffirmed by the non-proliferation Treaty. With the end of the cold war much of the hostility and misunderstanding that created the threat of nuclear annihilation disappeared. However, the proliferation of nuclear weapons now poses another threat to international security. This threat makes essential the unlimited extension of the NPT, and gives added meaning to the CTBT as a means to retard and even prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

A major United States aim is to ensure that the treaty achieves the broadest possible participation, since it is only through the widest participation that a CTBT can fully meet our overall non-proliferation objectives. A second major goal is to seek cost-effective, robust monitoring and verification measures in the treaty to guard against those who might seek to violate its provisions.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The CD embarks on CTBT negotiations with a wealth of multilateral negotiating experience. The partial test-ban Treaty and the chemical weapons Convention are useful models and tools for use in the work before us. A prime issue as we begin negotiations is the overall structure of the treaty, which could follow the CWC model. This appears to be the approach followed in Australia's proposed outline (CD/1235 and Corr.1), or "table of contents" for a treaty. We look forward to commenting on treaty structure in the NTB Ad Hoc Committee and hope the Committee can reach quick agreement on structure which will serve as a guide for its work.

On general treaty obligations, or the scope of the treaty, the United States believes that the treaty should constitute a comprehensive ban. It should not be a threshold treaty; rather, it should focus on nuclear-weapons explosions and rule out all nuclear explosions any time anywhere. Moreover, the United States has long believed that any nuclear explosion could provide military benefits. Therefore, there should be no exceptions for so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. Such a comprehensive prohibition can be achieved by employing language similar to that of article 1 of the partial test-ban Treaty, which concerns "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion," a formulation similar to that contained in the NPT. This is the approach reflected in the Swedish draft treaty text (CD/1232), and we endorse such an approach which provides an appropriately broad definition of what we want to achieve.

The United States does not yet have a fixed view on entry into force (or EIF), but we do have some general ideas. To achieve non-proliferation goals, the CTBT must gain wide - even universal - adherence. It is also essential that all nuclear-weapon States be party to the treaty at EIF. The United States would favour an approach designed to garner early adherence by a significant number of key States, but we would have some doubt about making EIF contingent on ratification by a specific group of States, beyond the nuclear-weapons States. Hence we believe that the considerations that led to the rather conservative entry-into-force provisions of the CWC should not apply to the CTBT.

Conversely, we believe the CWC could well serve as a model for development of a CTBT sanctions regime. We naturally hope that effective CTBT verification provisions will have a deterrent effect on would-be violators. Nevertheless, the CTBT should provide for rigorous, non-discriminatory collective action against violators and for ultimate recourse to the United Nations Security Council.

The international verification regime will be the central element in this treaty. We believe that such a regime must ensure high confidence among the parties to the CTBT that there is compliance with the provisions of the treaty, without creating an unnecessary burden for participants. At the same time, any verification regime must be constrained by the limits of monitoring technology and the costs of operating a regime.

In our view, an effective CTBT verification regime should have an efficient monitoring capability consisting of multiple components, e.g., a seismic network, atmospheric sampling for radionuclides and gaseous debris,

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

and provisions for on-site inspections. This system should be capable of identifying and attributing with high confidence evasively conducted nuclear explosions of less than a few kilotons' yield in broad areas of the globe.

Responsibility for effective verification will have to be shared among the parties individually and also in the context of an international structure for treaty implementation. The costs of establishing, operating, and maintaining monitoring networks will have to be shared equitably. We will need carefully to assess monitoring resources already available internationally, and to identify those that can help form the basis for an international system.

Clearly an international organization will be required to manage the exchange of relevant monitoring data, to provide a forum for rapid review of requests for on-site inspection, to administer the conduct of an approved on-site inspection and to provide a forum for the discussion and collective assessment of treaty compliance questions presented by the parties to the treaty. We believe that such an organization can be kept within acceptable managerial and cost-effective parameters. Some delegations have proposed that IAEA undertake these responsibilities, but the United States has reservations about this approach.

Caution should be applied in regard to how far the CTBT verification net should be cast. We have not been able to identify any pre-test activities unique to a covert nuclear-weapons programme that could reasonably be monitored under a CTBT, without considerable technical and political difficulty and enormous increase in cost. We have strong doubts regarding pre-test verification and believe this field should be reserved for NPT-related activities.

My statement includes preliminary comments on some of the main issues that we will be working on collectively in the months ahead. I look forward to presenting more views on verification and other elements of a CTBT as thinking in Washington progresses further. As a nuclear-weapons State, my country feels a special responsibility to make a meaningful contribution to these CTB negotiations. We intend to carry out that responsibility with our stated CTBT goals and the necessary maintenance of our security in mind.

Now that the Conference has re-established the NTB Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate a CTBT, and has approved, as Committee Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, the way is clear to begin negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. I can assure you that the United States delegation is ready to go to work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement.

(continued in English)

I am particularly grateful to him for the very kind words he addressed to me, and for his good wishes. I congratulate him on his mastery of the French language.

(The President)

(continued in French)

We have now reached the end of the list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? None does.

At our last plenary meeting, we appointed the chairmen of three ad hoc committees and two special coordinators. The appointment of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space was left pending. I am happy to be able to propose the candidature of Ambassador Pérez Novoa of Cuba for this post. May I take it that the Conference decides to accept this proposal?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I would like to convey my warm congratulations to Ambassador Pérez Novoa and wish him every success in his task. I would ask the Cuban delegation to pass on these congratulations to Ambassador Pérez Novoa.

With the appointment of Ambassador Pérez Novoa to the post of Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Space, the Conference is now in a position to begin its substantive work. I would like to take this opportunity to renew my thanks to all the delegations for the flexibility and spirit of compromise which have enabled us to arrive at this result.

I now turn to consideration of the new requests for participation in our work from the following non-member States: Madagascar and Spain. The secretariat has circulated a note from the President today (CD/WP.452) containing these requests. No objections were raised to these requests during the consultations I carried out. Accordingly, I suggest that we adopt the recommendation contained in document CD/WP.452 directly in plenary, on the understanding that this will not constitute a precedent for future occasions on which an informal meeting may be necessary. May I take it that the Conference so decides?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): We have now reached the end of our agenda for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? If not, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. Before doing so I wish to remind delegations that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will be holding its first meeting this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. in this room. I would also like to invite the chairmen of the ad hoc committees and the special coordinators who have been appointed to a meeting immediately after this plenary meeting in room I for the purpose of finalizing the timetable of future meetings.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 10 February 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.